Mohamed Ibrahim / Hassan-kaafi Halane

Alexander Hug, principal deputy head of the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine came to Finland on the invitation of the Finnish Peace Committee. He did, indeed, have high-level meetings with the Finnish government’s Foreign Affairs Minister and Parliament. Still, he made his visit as public and transparent as possible trying to reach out to different layers of Finnish society, which is inseparable from common European space. Therefore, special effort was made to make Alexander Hug’s statements also available to Russian-speaking people. Unlike Helsingin Sanomat or Suomen Kuvalehti, it became impossible to draw the attention of Russian language Yle. Therefore, the decision was made to reach out to European Russians (and not only those via the Russian-language media of the Baltic states). That’s the background of the interviews Alexander Hug gave in Finland to media outlets based outside the country, including DELFI portal, which is a major online outlet in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

How long have you been in Ukraine? What are your main tasks, goals and methods? What are the sources of financing the mission?

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission was deployed on 21 March 2014, following a request to the OSCE by Ukraine’s government and a consensus decision by all 57 OSCE participating States.

In accordance with its mandate, the Mission monitors and reports on the security situation. The other important task is facilitation of dialogue, both on the ground and in the format of the Trilateral Contact Group. In particular, the Chief Monitor coordinates the working group on security issues of the Trilateral Contact Group – one of the available platforms where discussions take place in order to resolve the conflict with political and diplomatic measures.

The Special Monitoring Mission is funded by contributions from the 57 OSCE participating States. In addition, the SMM is financed through extra-budgetary – voluntary – contributions. This includes both financial assistance and the donation of equipment.

OSCE monitors – who they are, where, how many of them are there at the moment, what do they know about the area, the mentality of the people, the historical and political situation on both sides, do they speak Russian or Ukrainian? Where are they located and based? Whose side do they take – the Ukrainian or Russian?

The Mission has 652 international monitors from 44 OSCE participating States. Currently 572 of them are deployed to Donetsk and Luhansk regions and work from one of 14 Mission locations along the line of contact. They bring a wide range of skills to their jobs, including experience in conflict environments, interpersonal skills and experience working with political and security issues, including monitors with backgrounds in humanitarian or diplomatic work, police or military.

Knowledge of Ukrainian and Russian languages, as well as experience of working in Eastern Europe and knowledge of the region is an asset, but not a strict requirement.

As for your last question, the Mission operates under the principles of impartiality and transparency. All our monitors, as well as other international and national staff sign the OSCE Code of Conduct. This document – which is publicly available – requires all OSCE officials to conduct themselves at the highest personal and professional level at all times, while on duty and off duty; and not to engage in any activity which is incompatible with the proper performance of their duties or may adversely reflect on the integrity, independence and impartiality of their position and function.

Why don’t people discuss the situation in Donbas, where many people are dying, much less than the actions of ISIS? Is Europe not that interesting?

Indeed, media attention on developments in eastern Ukraine does compete with other dire situations happening all over the world and does not always make the headlines. However I would not say that Europe is not interested in the situation in eastern Ukraine. The fact that 57 participating States have all agreed to deploy a mission such as the Special Monitoring Mission is a strong indication that Europe does indeed take the situation in Ukraine seriously, even if it isn’t always front page news.

The SMM is also playing its part in raising awareness of what is happening on the ground. We publish our observations on a daily basis on our website and through our social media accounts in three languages.

Mohamed Ibrahim / Hassan-kaafi Halane

To what extent are the Minsk Agreements not being implemented in Donbas at the moment? Was there a period when they were carried out? Are the Russian military personnel present in Donbas?

The Minsk agreements are being violated on both sides. The SMM continues to record hundreds, and on some days thousands, of ceasefire violations. Last week more than 85% of the ceasefire violations were recorded in three “hot spots”: the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area, east of Mariupol in the area located between Vodiane, Pikuzy (formerly Komiternove) and Sakhanka, and south-west, south and south-east of Svitlodarsk.

We also continue to report on the presence of weapons in violation of withdrawal lines – mortars, tanks, artillery pieces, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and record the use of such weapons. For instance, last week the SMM recorded 144 explosions attributable to such weapons.

It is known the sides are able to stop fighting when they wish to, so it is not an issue of a lack of command and control – our reports are a testimony to this fact. To provide a concrete example: the sides recommitted to cease fire before the school year start in September 2016. Within hours the conflict zone fell silent and for an entire day, the SMM did not record a single ceasefire violation. Unfortunately, the reality of the sides being able to turn off the violence on short order is that they can also turn it back on again just as quickly.

Finally, we report on facts as we observe them, but we do not conduct investigations. We have seen fighters who wore clothes with insignia of the Russian Federation. We have interviewed detainees who claimed they were members of a unit of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. All this information is documented in our reports, publicly available in Russian, Ukrainian and English. We don’t draw conclusions from our observations – we report what we see or hear and it is for the readers of our reports to draw their own conclusions based on this objective information.

For instance, last week the SMM recorded 144 explosions attributable to such weapons.

Can you say if some of the parties are more likely to first violate the Minsk agreements or provoke violations?

This question has been asked often, yet it is difficult to answer, as to who started it because a conflict is not a clinical operation. It is not just one shot from one side and one from another.

For instance, if a monitor stands and sees that one side is shooting, it is not clear if this is a response to a prior shot, or reaction to the relocation of tanks. Or, maybe, there is shooting 1km further up from there that provoked the fire. It is difficult if not impossible to say who started it.

What is important to ask is what steps have been taken in the direction of what has already been agreed, towards bringing more stabilisation to the situation.

On which side of the contact line do they listen to you more and less interfere with your work?

The SMM faces restrictions on its freedom of movement and other impediments on both sides of the contact line. At the same time, the nature of these restrictions is different. They are far more intimidating and threatening in areas outside government control.

The number of such incidents has increased since the beginning of the year. They culminated in an incident that happened on 23 April, when an SMM vehicle was severely damaged as a result of an explosion near so-called “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb. As a result, a patrol member died and two were injured.

SMM monitors continue to face security threats after this fatal incident. For instance, on 5 May, an armed man sexually harassed a female patrol member and threatened to stop the patrol from moving east of so-called “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. Or on 17 May a smoke-generating device was thrown from a military-type truck and landed some ten metres in front of an SMM vehicle near so-called “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk.

These incidents not only limit the Mission’s observations but also challenge the OSCE Permanent Council, which has stipulated that the SMM monitors should have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine to fulfil their mandate; and they violate the Minsk agreements. The sides must provide unimpeded and safe access to the OSCE SMM, in accordance with its mandate and the Minsk agreements, to allow the Mission to do its job.

Unfortunately, the reality of the sides being able to turn off the violence on short order is that they can also turn it back on again just as quickly.

How can you characterize the situation in the Donbas from the beginning of 2017? How many people have died from military and civilian actions – from weapons or from poor standards of living (shortage of medicines, food, water, heat)?

The level of violence fluctuates on a daily basis – from a few hundred to well over a thousand ceasefire violations recorded every day. We observed serious escalation in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle in the end of January-beginning of February.  In the first week of the month the number of ceasefire violations recorded by the SMM almost tripled, compared with the week before. The number of explosions caused by weapons proscribed by the Minsk agreements – namely, mortars, tanks and artillery – saw a six-fold increase. Of those explosions caused by these proscribed weapons, over 40 percent were caused by multiple launch rocket systems.

There has been some decrease in violence since then. However the security situation remains tense and volatile.

The worst consequence of the ongoing fighting is numerous civilian casualties. The human cost makes for particularly harrowing reading. So far this year, we have confirmed 219 civilian casualties: 44 of them were killed, and 175 injured. It represents more than a 120 per cent increase compared with the number of casualties recorded during the same period in 2016.

There has been some decrease in violence since then. However the security situation remains tense and volatile.

What was done and what can be done to minimize the number of civilian casualties?

More than 80% of civilian casualties that we have been confirming have been injured or killed by shrapnel from heavy weapons. Many others are injured or killed by mines or unexploded ordnance. Therefore, if these weapons are withdrawn as was agreed or mined areas are de-mined or at least marked or fenced off, many casualties among the civilian population can be avoided.

The other key measure that should be taken in order to reach a sustainable ceasefire and allows protecting both the civilian population and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line is disengagement of forces and hardware.

Though we have observed partial withdrawal of weapons since the signing of the Minsk agreements, we still see a large amount of proscribed weapons within the agreed withdrawn lines.

The sides have also not always maintained positions, resulting in proximity of forces and hardware.

The contact line runs through many of the most populated areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

This inevitably means much of the fighting we observe takes place in an urban or semi-urban environment, with soldiers and armed men and hardware often dug in and positioned among civilian infrastructure. Firing from these positions invites retaliatory strikes that mean the people living in the area more often than not are the ones who are hit.

The sides must therefore remove their personnel and hardware from residential areas.

This inevitably means much of the fighting we observe takes place in an urban or semi-urban environment, with soldiers and armed men and hardware often dug in and positioned among civilian infrastructure.

Do you believe in the absolute victory of one of the sides? What do you see as the most realistic option for a complete solution to the conflict?

I will not speculate on possible scenarios. However, there is one obvious and most realistic way to put an end to the conflict – the sides need to implement what they have agreed to a long time ago. Therefore, they need to cease fire, withdraw weapons proscribed in the Minsk agreements, disengage, and prioritise the protection of the civilian population.

We have all the necessary agreements – on ceasefire, withdrawal of weapons and mine action. The sides have already agreed to them. On the dotted line. What they have to do now is to live up to their promises.

What are the risks of a deteriorating situation?

The main risks are the root causes – proximity of forces and formations, and presence of heavy weapons – which still remain in place. So long as the sides refuse to disengage and withdraw Minsk-proscribed weapons, the risk of a flare-up remains an ever-present danger.

This inevitably means much of the fighting we observe takes place in an urban or semi-urban environment, with soldiers and armed men and hardware often dug in and positioned among civilian infrastructure.

Who could benefit from the death of an OSCE official on April 23, do you consider this an intentional action and what are the consequences of this incident for both sides?

I will not speculate on intentions of those who placed this explosive device or draw conclusions on the consequences for the sides.

What I can definitely say is that this weapon intentionally was placed in that location to injure, maim or kill someone – but because of the indiscriminate nature of it, that someone could have been any of the people who travel that road every day.

I can also say that there have been some consequences for the SMM operations. In fact, the SMM restricted its patrolling to asphalt and concrete surfaces following the fatal incident. These restrictions continue to limit the Mission’s monitoring activities, as they constrain our ability to monitor the use and (non-) compliance with the withdrawal of weapons; curtail our ability to use remote observation technologies which require operators to step away from hard-surfaced roads to launch or maintain them; and limit our ability to speak to civilians living away from hard surfaced roads.

The restrictions on implementation of the SMM’s mandate are under regular review but are likely to remain in place until the sides take measurable steps to remove mines or mark or fence them off.

What are the implicit dangers inherent in this war – epidemics, ecological catastrophe?

The SMM in many of its reports and in other fora made note of developments that could have detrimental effects on the environment and that could potentially threaten the health and lives of residents in Donbas.  Donetsk Water Filtration Station which has been shelled numerous times during the last four months stands out in this regard. Hitting the chlorine tanks there could spell environmental disaster for the wider region. In addition almost 345,000 people on both sides of the contact line are dependent on the plant for clean drinking water.

There are also a number of other facilities representing a potential risk if hit by shelling, such as the Bakhmut Agrarian Union located in the village of Novoluhanske and Novhorodske Phenol Factory.

The only way to protect these facilities is to withdraw heavy weapons and to disengage positions.

We in the SMM have been doing our best to minimize the danger and to keep these facilities functioning so that they continue to provide essential services. The SMM facilitates and monitors so-called “windows of silences” coordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) to enable repairs at essential civilian infrastructure, including Donetsk Water Filtration Station.

In April the SMM conducted 46 such “mirror patrols” (simultaneous patrols on both sides of the contact line) in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

As a result, after repair works at Donetsk Water Filtration Station, the provision of water to 345,000 people on both sides of the contact line was resumed. Also the repair work on high voltage transmission wires providing electricity to five villages north of Luhansk city was completed.

Hitting the chlorine tanks there could spell environmental disaster for the wider region. In addition almost 345,000 people on both sides of the contact line are dependent on the plant for clean drinking water.

Do you have any observers from Latvia? How could Latvia help to resolve the conflict?

Latvia has always shown full support for the role of the SMM and for the full implementation of its mandate. As of now, the Mission has two seconded monitors from Latvia. The SMM OSCE is confident that Latvia’s support for peace and normalisation in Ukraine will continue.

Questions put to Alexander by Kristina Khudenko.

More info on the OSCE